ANTITRUST:E.U. COMMISSION ACCEPTS COMMITMENTS BY GDF SUEZ 5-12-2009
The European Commission has adopted a decision that renders legally binding commitments offered by the French energy company GDF Suez to boost competition on the French gas market.
The
European Commission has adopted a decision that renders legally
binding commitments offered by the French energy company GDF Suez to
boost competition on the French gas market.
In
particular, the commitments address Commission concerns that GDF Suez
may have closed off competitors from access to gas import capacity
into France in breach of EU rules on abuse of a dominant market
position (Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) 1
- see MEMO/08/328
and IP/09/1097
). In response to the Commission's concerns, GDF Suez offered a
major structural reduction of its long-term reservations on French
gas import infrastructure capacity. In the light of GDF Suez's
commitments, the Commission has now closed its investigation.
Competition
Commissioner Neelie Kroes said: “The remedies offered by GDF Suez
provide a real opportunity for competitors to enter the French gas
market and so offer energy consumers greater choice of gas supplier
and more competitive prices. The remedies will improve structural
access to French gas import infrastructure and contribute to an
integrated and competitive single European energy market that can
provide a secure supply of energy at affordable prices."
In July
2009, the Commission consulted interested parties on the commitments
proposed by GDF Suez to address the Commission's competition concerns
(see IP/09/1097
). The respondents confirmed that the commitments were adequate
and proportionate to remedy the concerns. In its final commitments
proposal, GDF Suez has also taken due account of a number of relevant
points resulting from the Commission's market test.
In the
course of its investigation, the Commission came to the preliminary
view that GDF Suez's long-term reservations for most of France's gas
import capacity, as well as its behaviour relating to investment and
capacity allocation at two liquefied natural gas import terminals in
France, might have infringed EU rules on the abuse of a dominant
market position (Article 102 of TFEU).The Commission was concerned
that this conduct largely closed off access to the French gas market
to other potential gas suppliers.
New
entrants into gas markets require access to gas import infrastructure
(such as pipelines and liquefied natural gas terminals). Insufficient
access to infrastructure limits their ability to acquire customers,
no matter how competitive their offers may be. Preventing new
entrants from gaining access to infrastructure therefore, hinders the
development of competition in energy markets.
Under
the proposed commitments, GDF Suez will rapidly release a large share
of its long-term reservations of gas import capacity into France, and
will then continue to reduce its share to below 50% of these
reservations. These commitments should have a major structural impact
on the possibility for other companies to compete on the French
market, to the benefit of domestic and industrial gas consumers.
The
Commission reviewed the commitments in close cooperation with the
French energy regulator.
The
Commission had initiated its investigations into the French energy
market in May 2006 (see MEMO/06/205
), as a follow-up to the energy sector competition inquiry (see
IP/07/26
and MEMO/07/15
). Antitrust proceedings against GDF were formally opened in May
2008 (see MEMO/08/328
).
Background
The
Commission's decision is based on Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 on
the implementation of the EU Treaty's competition rules. It takes
into account the results of the market test launched in July 2009
(see IP/09/1097
). This decision, which does not conclude whether there is an
infringement, legally binds GDF Suez to the commitments it has
offered and ends the Commission's investigation. If GDF Suez were to
break its commitments, the Commission could impose a fine of up to
10% of GDF Suez's total annual turnover without having to prove any
violation of the EU Treaty's competition rules.
See
also MEMO/09/536
.